Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, will head to the ballot boxes on Wednesday for a largely unremarkable general election. The two presidential candidates — President Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, a former army commander — also faced off five years ago. The gap between them on major policy issues has since narrowed, but the president’s lead in polls seems to have widened. Still, the election is noteworthy in one respect: the record deployment of negative campaigning, and sometimes outright disinformation, on both sides.
The two candidates, though nominally quite different, hardly have distinguished themselves from the other on the economy, foreign policy or even religion. Perhaps that’s why their official campaign strategists, the officious operations they tacitly back and overzealous independent supporters together have produced a cocktail of negative ads, fake news and outright hoaxes to create buzz around their man.
Indonesia’s leading investigative journalism magazine, Tempo, revealed late last year that both camps were relying on what the exposé called “shadow teams,” attacking each other using “fake news spread by proxies” — a form of “black campaigning that could not be carried out by candidates’ official teams.” A recent Reuters investigation uncovered groups of “fake-news peddlers” who, according to the article, appeared to want to exploit “ethnic or religious divides.”
Hundreds of informal campaigners thought to be paid by politicians or their business acolytes — known locally as “buzzers” — create hashtags on Twitter and material for Facebook and Instagram ferrying nasty messages about their opponents, often using aliases or ghost accounts. Negative campaigning is nothing new in Indonesia, but there, as elsewhere, ever-popular digital platforms and messaging apps help spread the material faster. (More than 80 percent of internet users in Indonesia use Facebook and WhatsApp.)
Mr. Prabowo and his Islamist allies have tried to portray Mr. Joko as un-Islamic. Mr. Joko’s lead shrank during the 2014 presidential campaign as material circulated stating (incorrectly) that he was Chinese, Christian and a communist. The message has taken root: In a national survey in December, one-fifth of respondents who had heard that Mr. Joko was born to a Christian parent now believed the news, and nearly one-quarter of respondents who had heard that he was Chinese believed that to be true.
Conservative religious groups, many of which back Mr. Prabowo, have become more vociferous online in recent years. A network that calls itself the Muslim Cyber Army helped sway the race for governor in Jakarta in 2017, partly by spreading fake news about one candidate, an ally of Mr. Joko’s. Ahead of this week’s election, other groups have claimed — spuriously — that the president wanted to ban religious teaching in schools and abolish the call to prayer, among other things.
Although Mr. Joko has had a comfortable lead in opinion polls throughout the campaign, his administration has pushed back, and hard, against disinformation targeting him. Its first response was to try to raise the public’s awareness about online hoaxes. But then its own tactics took a more problematic turn.
Placing little trust in social media platforms to remove offending content, the government has threatened to ban Facebook and block WhatsApp in Indonesia. Mr. Joko has instructed security forces to clamp down on citizens who spread fake news. The police have made numerous arrests, including of important members of the Muslim Cyber Army, for sharing posts online that, according to the head of the police’s cybercrime directorate, were “either provocative or simply false.”
Earlier this year, the musician and Prabowo supporter Ahmad Dhani was sentenced to 18 months in jail for a series of tweets from 2017, including one thought to refer to that losing candidate in the 2017 race for Jakarta governor (“anyone who supports the blasphemer is scum and deserves to be spat in the face”). Mr. Dhani was charged under the Electronic Information and Transactions Law of 2008, which penalizes defamation online. But the opposition claims that the law has been used for political ends. Mr. Dhani has since gotten in trouble again, under the same law, for saying that opponents to a #2019ChangeThePresident rally he attended last summer were “idiots.”
I find few records of arrests of people charged with slandering opposition figures. That could be because government supporters do less bad mouthing; more likely, it says something about the selective enforcement of the law. (Mr. Joko is known to have close ties to the police.)
The president has also gone on the counteroffensive online. One campaigner for Mr. Joko made this case for resorting to disinformation to me last month: “Michelle Obama said, ‘When they go low, we go high.’ But it didn’t work. Trump won. So here, when they go low, we go lower.”
Pro-Joko buzzers likely are behind hashtags like #PrabowoJumatanDimana (Where is Prabowo during Friday prayers?): Mr. Prabowo comes from a multidenominational family and is known for not being especially devout. Another trending hashtag is #ManaKeluargamu (Where is your family?), a reference to the fact that Mr. Prabowo is separated from his wife and his only son lives overseas. And then there are the allegations that Mr. Prabowo’s campaign is somehow affiliated with ISIS in various ways.
It is extremely difficult to identify which claim or lie comes from the campaigns themselves, buzzers or outsiders, but together these messages have created a dangerous pattern: A political opposition lagging in opinion polls spreads misleading content online about the president, and he deploys state institutions to crack down on them even as his campaigners and supporters put out misleading material of their own. As much as Indonesia’s politicians have been warning the people about disinformation, it is largely they and their teams who are producing fake news.
One result is an election campaign that has been more snide than substantive and that, in the name of differentiating two candidates who aren’t distinguishable enough, harps on supposedly deep social and political divisions — “this great disconnect,” as one candidate for vice president put it — that may not really exist.
Another effect of these dirty tactics is to undermine the credibility of the system itself.
Mr. Prabowo’s team has already questioned the legitimacy of the election, citing problems with voter lists and other irregularities — it could be feeding a convenient line to fake-news peddlers. Meanwhile, the police arrested two people last week for claiming that the election’s results had already been predetermined by the election commission and that Mr. Joko will be said to have won 57 percent of the votes.
Mr. Joko’s likely victory over Mr. Prabowo on Wednesday will come as a relief to many Indonesian liberals and minority groups. Yet they should be worried about the latest practices of a president once heralded as a democratic reformer. That Mr. Joko’s government has chosen to respond to disinformation with disinformation signals a dangerous backsliding for democracy in Indonesia.
Ross Tapsell is a researcher and Indonesia specialist at the Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific, in Canberra.
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平码公式破解器“【林】【峰】【你】【通】【过】【了】。“【执】【事】【直】【接】【对】【着】【林】【峰】【说】【道】，【眼】【中】【带】【着】【几】【分】【感】【慨】，【感】【慨】【林】【峰】【的】【好】【运】【气】。 “【他】【领】【取】【的】【不】【是】【炼】【狱】【级】【别】【吗】？【怎】【么】【还】【会】【通】【过】【呢】？“【一】【人】【吃】【惊】【问】【道】。 【执】【事】【看】【了】【对】【方】【一】【眼】【冷】【声】【说】【道】：“【大】【长】【老】【吩】【咐】【了】，【这】【一】【次】【的】【炼】【狱】【级】【别】【的】【试】【炼】【就】【是】【考】【验】【的】【勇】【气】，【一】【个】【精】【英】【弟】【子】，【连】【勇】【于】【面】【对】【困】【难】【的】【勇】【气】【都】【没】【有】，【那】【还】【算】【什】【么】
【这】【次】【的】【题】【材】【是】【灵】【气】【复】【苏】【加】【类】【似】【无】【限】【流】【的】【游】【戏】【模】【式】，【整】【体】【氛】【围】【是】【以】【轻】【松】【为】【主】，【但】【也】【会】【牵】【涉】【到】【许】【多】【更】【深】【层】【次】【的】【东】【西】，【比】【如】【亲】【情】、【友】【情】、【守】【护】、【奋】【斗】【之】【类】【的】，【逻】【辑】【性】【仍】【是】【不】【是】【变】，【这】【一】【点】【始】【终】【是】【我】【写】【书】【的】【根】【本】。 【大】【伙】【喜】【欢】【这】【种】【题】【材】【的】，【可】【以】【去】【看】【一】【看】，【如】【果】【满】【意】，【还】【请】【收】【藏】【推】【荐】【支】【持】。 【另】【外】，【更】【新】【暂】【定】【每】【天】【两】【章】，【不】【定】
【在】【这】【里】【跟】【各】【位】【书】【友】【们】【说】【一】【声】【抱】【歉】，【因】【为】【这】【本】【书】【没】【有】【大】【纲】【的】【原】【因】，【当】【时】【脑】【袋】【一】【热】，【就】【开】【书】【了】。 【完】【全】【没】【有】【一】【点】【方】【向】，【而】【且】【也】【是】【新】【人】【作】【者】，【这】【样】【就】【更】【写】【不】【下】【去】【了】，【所】【以】【这】【也】【是】【我】【为】【什】【么】【不】【更】【新】【的】【原】【因】。 【不】【知】【道】【更】【新】【什】【么】【内】【容】，【整】【天】【纠】【结】【半】【天】，【脑】【瓜】【贼】【疼】，【等】【想】【好】【了】，【都】【特】【么】【到】【晚】【上】【了】，【一】【章】【也】【码】【不】【出】【来】，【第】【二】【天】【就】【会】【觉】
“【我】【们】【在】【这】【地】【方】【生】【活】【了】【无】【数】【年】，【如】【何】【对】【付】【这】【些】【下】【贱】【之】【物】，【自】【然】【是】【有】【些】【心】【得】【的】。”【灵】【说】【道】，“【更】【何】【况】，【现】【在】【你】【们】【是】【我】【们】【的】【盟】【友】。” “【你】【愿】【意】【的】【话】【就】【和】【我】【一】【起】【去】，【但】【注】【意】【别】【送】【了】【命】！”【凌】【耸】【耸】【肩】，“【别】【忘】【了】，【上】【次】【你】【可】【是】【被】【我】【在】【完】【全】【看】【不】【见】【的】【情】【况】【击】【中】【了】【好】【几】【次】。” “【对】【付】【它】【们】【我】【还】【是】【有】【自】【信】【的】。” “【算】【了】，【我】平码公式破解器【持】【续】【不】【断】【的】【打】【击】【之】【下】，【白】【龙】【寺】【的】【僧】【人】【们】【也】【有】【些】【疲】【累】。 【全】【力】【轰】【击】【一】【处】，【内】【气】、【体】【力】【的】【消】【耗】【都】【是】【看】【得】【见】【的】。【虽】【然】【肯】【定】【比】【高】【烈】【度】【的】【生】【死】【战】【斗】【要】【轻】【松】【一】【些】，【但】【总】【归】【有】【个】【尽】【头】。 【不】【过】，【那】【头】【大】【邪】【魔】【率】【先】【扛】【不】【住】【了】。 【外】【面】【在】【玄】【宇】【带】【领】【之】【下】【的】、【临】【之】【境】【的】【白】【龙】【寺】【僧】【人】【们】【的】【打】【击】，【还】【都】【是】【其】【次】，【最】【重】【要】【的】【是】【他】【们】【的】【攻】【势】【带】【来】【的】
【张】【太】【后】【薨】【逝】，【至】【德】【帝】【只】【是】【停】【了】【大】【朝】【会】，【小】【朝】【会】【却】【一】【日】【未】【停】。 【卯】【时】【正】【刻】，【至】【德】【帝】【带】【着】【鲁】【王】【洛】【王】【四】【皇】【子】【五】【皇】【子】【六】【皇】【子】【去】【给】【张】【太】【后】【跪】【了】【灵】，【半】【个】【时】【辰】【后】，【宗】【室】【跪】【灵】【时】，【他】【就】【去】【了】【御】【书】【房】，【和】【靖】【王】、【宗】【正】【司】【礼】【王】，【六】【部】【尚】【书】、【督】【察】【院】【左】【副】【都】【御】【史】，【还】【有】【三】【位】【大】【学】【士】，【继】【续】【商】【讨】【张】【太】【后】【陵】【寝】【一】【事】。 【右】【相】【倒】【台】【后】，【至】【德】【帝】【果】【然】